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ABSTRACT. In this research we studied empirical relationships between agricultural production dynamics
and six quantitative World Bank governance indicators for 173 countries between 1975 and 2007. It is
hypothesized that in countries with lower quality of governance, agricultural production increases are more
likely to be achieved by area expansions than by increases in yields. We distinguished four groups of
countries: those with both area and yield increases; those with increasing yields but decreasing area; those
with decreasing yields but a growing area; and those with both declines in yields and area. We analyzed
differences between these four groups, and also analyzed governance-production relationships within these
groups. On average, quality of governance is low in countries with both area and yield increases and high
in countries with increasing yields but decreasing area. Countries with declining yields were too few in
number to allow for quantitative analyses. The analysis of governance-production relationships within the
four groups suggests that countries with a lower quality of governance are more inclined to achieve
production increases by expanding agricultural area rather than increasing yields. Additional explanatory
value of governance indicators to agricultural production dynamics is generally small, but nevertheless
significant in most cases. Our results suggest that, in order for agricultural production to increase without
excessive expansions of agricultural area, governance issues should be resolved.
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INTRODUCTION
Recently, the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) adjusted its projections of future food and
feed demand (FAO 2009a). Because of population
growth and, more importantly, a rise in economic
welfare, global food and feed production should
increase by 70% by 2050. To attain such an increase
in production, cultivated area has to expand and/or
yields have to increase. Although some argue that
there is a vast potential for yield increase to meet
the required production increase (Neumann et al.
2010), the question remains whether or not this
increase in yields is likely to happen. The potential
for yield increase is highest in developing countries,
where current productivity levels are far below
potentially attainable levels (Byerlee and Fischer
2002, Marra et al. 2003). However, many
developing countries are also characterized by a
lower quality of governance, which may hinder
yield increase for a number of reasons. One is that
investments in research and development are too
low to achieve the region-specific technology
required for yield increase; second is that the
investment climate at farm level is often
unfavorable so that buying equipment and inputs
required for intensification is difficult; and third,
natural areas are abundant and not well protected,
making expansion of agricultural area at the expense
of nature an attractive alternative to intensification
(Kakonge 1998).
In the past, many attempts have been made to
describe and predict agricultural yields and land use
at a global level. Most of the studies concerning
yields had a biophysical character (Soltani et al.
1999, Harrison et al. 2000, Hafner 2003, Nuemann
et al. 2010), whereas most of the land use studies
had an economic character (Veldkamp and Fresco
1996, Rounsevell et al. 2005, Eickhout et al. 2006,
Mittenzwei et al. 2007). Although numerous
examples of cases where rural conditions were
affected by governance can be found in literature,
quantitative, global analyses of governance effects
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on agriculture are few. Those that sketch effects of
policies are relatively abundant (EC 2000, Van
Kersbergen and Van Waarden 2004, Biermann
2007, Jansson et al. 2008), but those that relate
overall governance quality to agriculture are rare.
Only recently has more attention been paid to
governance effects (IFPRI 2006, von Braun and
Islam 2008, FAO 2009b, FAO 2009c) on
agriculture. These qualitative studies related
governance regarding land transactions, i.e., access
to market and property rights enforcement, to
investments in research and development, i.e., yield
increase. However, they did not demonstrate that
governance characteristics are indeed significant
factors for aggregate agricultural production. In
general it can be said that governance studies were
mostly characterized by qualitative studies of one
single regime, which could hardly be used to make
global quantitative inferences (Cash et al. 2006).
Now that the World Bank made a global inventory
of governance indicators, we can identify the role
of governance in agricultural dynamics.
To examine whether or not governance
characteristics are indeed significant factors
determining production increases, and whether
these are obtained from yield increase or from area
expansion, an empirical analysis of historical
tendencies of yield increase and area expansion was
performed. These observed agricultural production
dynamics, i.e., changes in cultivated arable area and
crop yields, were related to six governance
indicators that were recently produced by the World
Bank (Kaufmann et al. 2009). Using linear
regression techniques, we test the hypothesis that in
countries with lower quality of governance,
agricultural production increase is more likely to be
achieved by area expansion than by increase in
yield.
DATA
When studying real-world phenomena that are the
result of complex processes by means of regression
analysis, it is hardly ever possible to isolate the role
of the explanatory variable of interest from a wide
range of other explanatory variables. In our case,
we are interested in how well governance indicators
can explain agricultural production indicators, but
we cannot escape from the fact that governance is
correlated to many other variables that also explain
production indicators, e.g., climate, soils, economy,
and demography. For this reason, we try to include
these other variables as much as possible to account
for their potential impact. We will refer to these
variables as control indicators. Because of statistical
confounding we will not be able to distinguish
exactly which part of the explanatory power of the
regression can be attributed to each of the two
categories, i.e., the governance indicators and the
control indicators. We can nevertheless measure a
range of the explanatory power of governance. The
upper limit of this range is provided by the
explanatory power of the governance indicators
only, and the lower limit is provided by the
explanatory power of the governance indicators in
addition to the explanatory power of the control
indicators. The upper limit is likely to overestimate
explanatory power of governance, because this
estimate assumes that all common explanatory
power of the two categories of indicators should be
attributed to the governance indicators only.
Conversely, the latter one is likely to underestimate
explanatory power of governance, because this
estimate assumes that all common explanatory
power of the two categories of indicators should be
attributed to the control indicators. Therefore, true
explanatory power of governance is likely to be
within this range (Bakker et al. 2005).
Because all indicators had to be measured in a
similar manner for all countries in the analysis, we
were limited to use global databases such as those
of the FAO and the World Bank. Countries for
which no consistent data existed because they either
merged or split up into separate states during the
study period (1975-2007), e.g., former USSR,
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Ethiopia, were not
included. In total, 173 countries were included in
the analysis. Because we are interested in dynamics,
most indicators were computed as relative changes
between approximately 1975 and 2007. Only for
those indicators that were considered static in time,
e.g., soil variables, or for which sufficiently long
time series were not available (governance), a state
variable was used. For most of the control
indicators, both a change and an initial state value
were used. Changes were computed as the ratio
between initial states and final states. To correct for
interannual variability, initial states were computed
as the average over the period 1975-1980 and final
states were computed as the average over
2002-2007. All dependence on country size and
population size was eliminated by working with
relative values, e.g., changes relative to the initial
value or densities or fractions.
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Production indicators
Production dynamics between 1975 and 2007 were
expressed in terms of change in production, change
in yield, and change in cultivated area, all between
1975 and 2007 (Table 1). Clearly, one of these three
indicators is superfluous, i.e., given any two of
these, the third can be calculated. For this reason,
we only use changes in yield and cultivated area.
However, the mathematical relationship that
describes how these latter two indicators contribute
to production change provides insight that is
important for interpretation. Therefore, production
change is also described in the derivation below,
although it is not used in the analyses.
Yield changes were calculated for all different crop
types recorded in the FAO database (http://faostat.f
ao.org/site/567/default.aspx#ancor), after which a
weighted average was calculated on the basis of the
average cultivated area per crop type:
(1)
To account for interannual yield variability, Y1,i is
the average yield over 2002-2007, for crop i, and
Y0,i is the average yield over 1975-1980, for crop i.
Ai is the average cultivated area for crop i over
1975-2007. By computing yield changes separately
for all individual crops before averaging, effects of
shifts from heavy crops, e.g., potatoes, to light crops,
e.g., fibers, or from crops undergoing strong yield
increase to crops undergoing small yield increase,
are not mistaken for yield changes. All changes were
expressed as the log of the ratios of these averaged
initial and final values, to rescale the skewed
distribution and nonequidistant data, resulting from
working with positive ratios and strongly varying
growths/declines. This expression (Eq. 1) is defined
as dY and approximates the yield change at national
level (Y1 divided by Y0).
Similarly, changes in cultivated area were also
calculated for all of the recorded crop types:
(2)
in which A1,i is the average cultivated area over
2002-2007, for crop i, and A0,i is the average
cultivated area over 1975-1980, for crop i. This
expression is defined as dA and approximates the
change in total cultivated area at national level (A1 
divided by A0).
By calculating change in this way, one creates
dimensionless quantities providing information on
change between the first and last five years,
standardized for country-dependent properties such
as size. Adding the left and right hand sides of Eq.
1 and Eq. 2, we obtain an approximation of the
change in total production at national level, defined
as dP:
(3)
Therefore, dY can be interpreted as the relative
contribution of a change in yield to dP, thus
reflecting a trend toward more intensive (dY > 0) or
toward less intensive (dY < 0) agriculture. Similarly,
dA can be interpreted as the relative contribution of
a change in cultivated area to dP, thus reflecting a
trend toward more extensive (dA > 0) or toward less
extensive (dA < 0) agriculture.
Governance indicators
The World Bank identified six indicators for
governance (Kaufmann et al. 2009):
Voice and accountability represents the extent to
which citizens have political rights and civil
liberties, and are able to participate in selecting their
government. Yields were found to be significantly
higher in countries with more political rights and
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Table 1. Production, governance, and control indicators.
Indicators Source
Production indicators
Aggregate change in total agricultural production (-)
Aggregate change in total cultivated area (-)
Aggregate change in yield (-)
FAO †
FAO †
FAO †
Governance indicators
Voice and accountability (index between -2.5 and 2.5)
Government effectiveness (index between -2.5 and 2.5)
Regulatory quality (index between -2.5 and 2.5)
Rule of law (index between -2.5 and 2.5)
Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (index between -2.5 and 2.5)
Control of corruption (index between -2.5 and 2.5)
World Bank ‡
World Bank ‡
World Bank ‡
World Bank ‡
World Bank ‡
World Bank ‡
Control indicators
Change in agricultural export value index (-)
Initial agricultural export value index (share of total export value) (-)
Change in agricultural import value index (-)
Initial agricultural import value index (share of total import value) (-)
Change in net trade flow value (export minus import) (-)
Initial net trade flow value (export minus import) (share of total value) (-)
Change in GDP (PPP) (-)
Initial GDP (PPP) (International $/capita/yr)
Change in economically active agricultural population (-)
Initial economically active agricultural population (share of total) (-)
Change in total population (-)
Initial total population density (persons/Km²)
Change in total economically active population (-)
Initial economically active population (share of total) (-)
Change in urban population (-)
Initial urban population (share of total) (-)
Change in rural population (-)
Initial rural population (share of total) (-)
Annual mean temperature (°C)
Annual precipitation (mm)
Fraction of area constrained by aluminum toxicity (-)
Fraction of area constrained by salinity (-)
Fraction of area constrained by high phosphorus fixation (-)
FAO §
FAO §
FAO §
FAO §
FAO §
FAO §
World Bank |
World Bank |
FAO ¶
FAO ¶
FAO ¶
FAO ¶
FAO ¶
FAO ¶
FAO ¶
FAO ¶
FAO ¶
FAO ¶
Worldclim #
Worldclim #
FAO ††
FAO ††
FAO ††
† FAO, faostat, accessed 01-09-09 (http://faostat.fao.org/site/567/default.aspx#ancor);
‡ World Bank, accessed 01-05-09 (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp);
§ FAO, tradestat, accessed 01-09-09 (http://faostat.fao.org/site/406/default.aspx);| World Bank; World Development Indicators, accessed 01-05-09 (http://www.worldbank.org/data); the international dollar is a
hypothetical unit of currency that has the same purchasing power that the U.S. dollar had in the United States at a given point in time, in
this case the year 2000.
¶ FAO, popstat, accessed 01-09-09 (http://faostat.fao.org/site/452/default.aspx);
# Worldclim, accessed 01-05-09 (http://www.worldclim.org/methods);
†† FAO, terrastat, accessed 01-09-09 (http://www.fao.org/ag/agl/agll/terrastat).
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civil liberties (Fulginiti et al. 2004), indicating that
agricultural development is related to voice and
accountability. Agricultural development requires
interactions between the rural population, e.g., labor
unions and agricultural associations, and government
agencies, e.g., extension service and ministry of
agriculture. Such interactions are believed to benefit
from political rights and civil liberties. Furthermore,
governance influences agricultural policies, tax
levels, and the conditions under which subsidies are
granted. The extent to which the rural population
can influence governance by political votes is
therefore supposed to express itself in improved
conditions for the rural population (Binswanger and
Deininger 1997).
Government effectiveness refers to the provision, by
government agencies, of public goods and services,
and quality thereof, such as infrastructure and
governmental agricultural research programs.
Infrastructure plays a key role for the agricultural
potential of remote rural areas to be used;
agricultural research and development play a key
role for yield increases (Thirtle et al. 2003).
Therefore, whether or not these public goods and
services can be delivered effectively by the
government is crucial to agricultural development.
Moreover, government effectiveness is known to
provide an adequate measure with respect to the
quality of these public goods and services, and in
particular for agricultural research and development
(Thirtle and Piesse 2007).
Regulatory quality expresses how well private
sector development is promoted by the government.
A poor promotion of private sector development
may negatively affect the performance of free
market mechanisms and investment climate, e.g.,
making it difficult for investors to get loans. In many
countries, poor regulatory quality is caused by
industrial protectionism: domestic trade policies
disturbing the balance between domestic and world
prices and preventing access to international
markets, thereby obstructing private sector
development (Lio and Liu 2008). Furthermore,
countries with poor regulatory quality tend to
implement policies that result in high taxation of
agriculture, which also has negative effects on
private sector development and investment
(Krueger et al. 1991).
Rule of law represents quality of contract and law
enforcement in general. Poor contract and law
enforcement hinders the protection of property and
the rights of landowners and tenants. In that case,
advances in agricultural development, i.e., yield
increase, are unlikely because these advances
strongly depend on private investments in
agricultural research and development (Thirtle et al.
2003). Such investments are not likely to be made,
when investors cannot be assured of future
revenues.
Political stability and absence of violence measures
the public perception of the likelihood of
destabilization or overthrowing of a government by
unconstitutional or violent means, leading to
domestic violence and terrorism. It is well known
that when violent political conflicts arise in a
country, food security is compromised by failure of
economic and social networks (Hussain and Herens
1997). In countries facing higher levels of political
conflict and war, yields were reported to be
significantly lower during these periods (Fulginiti
et al. 2004). Therefore, violent political
destabilization or overthrowing of government
would have negative effects on agriculture.
Control of corruption refers to the extent to which
public power is abused for private goals and gain.
In countries where corruption is controlled,
impartial authorities are often provided to check for
corruption of conventional authorities and to hold
them accountable if necessary. This increases the
likelihood that power and funds are used for what
they were intended. In countries that fail to control
corruption, powerful individuals have the
opportunity to abuse their influence to their
advantage, at the expense of other less powerful
individuals, e.g., farmers. For example, it has been
suggested that large fertilizer producers persuaded
African governments to impose particular
fertilization programs upon farmers through bribery
and other forms of corruption (World Bank 2010),
despite the fact that farmers often knew more about
the particular deficits of their soils. Imposing these
programs resulted in a loss of this knowledge, while
crop yields hardly benefited from the traditional N,
P, and K fertilizers that were, after all, developed in
and for temperate zones.
Annual governance indicator data were available
for all six indicators and all 173 countries, during
1996-2008. This period is too short to compute a
meaningful relative change, and does not
correspond to the period for which other indicators
were available (1975-2007). Therefore, averages
were calculated over 1996-2008 for all governance
indicators, which were included in the regression.
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Control indicators
Control indicators include biophysical, demographic,
and economic indicators (Table 1). These control
indicators were chosen because they are known to
be important determinants of agriculture in general.
Most control variables are correlated with
governance for a variety of reasons. As mentioned
earlier, because of this correlation we can only
identify a range of likely governance impact.
Because we also include control indicators that are
quite closely connected to governance, particularly
the economic indicators, we limit our assessment of
governance importance to that aspect of governance
that is independent from economic performance.
Because economic indicators are generally
associated with overall quality of governance, the
marginal explanatory values of governance are
likely to be underestimations.
METHODS
Between groups analysis
Groups of countries were classified according to
their production dynamics, derived from dY and dA.
Figure 1 presents a diagram of the different groups
of countries according to this classification. In this
diagram, countries can be in quadrant 1: area and
yield increase; quadrant 2: area decrease and yield
increase; quadrant 3: area and yield decrease; or in
quadrant 4: area increase and yield decrease. We
refer to these four groups as follows: “growth”
countries with expansion of cultivated area and
increasing yield (Q1); “intensifying” countries with
contraction of cultivated area but increasing yield
(Q2); “decline” countries with contraction of
cultivated area and decreasing yield (Q3); and
“expansion” countries with expansion of cultivated
area but decreasing yield (Q4). To explore
differences between these groups in terms of control
and governance indicators, we performed an
Analysis Of Variance (ANOVA). Specifically,
separate T-tests were performed for all possible
pairs of different quadrants and indicators, provided
that the number of observations was sufficient. This
analysis is referred to as the between groups
analysis.
Within groups analysis
Next, to test the maximal and marginal explanatory
value of governance indicators, we performed linear
regressions for all countries together and for the
groups individually. Although the between groups
analysis distinguished countries based on the sign
of dY and dA, the within groups analysis investigates
the spatial variability in dY and dA values within
groups, taking into account their correlation with
governance and control indicators. Multivariate
regression analysis was applied to examine
relationships between governance indicators and dY 
and dA. Because the number of observations was
not high enough to allow for the use of all indicators,
a preselection (per group and dependent dY and dA)
of indicators was made. This was done using the
following criteria: only one out of two correlated
indicators (i.e., with a Pearson correlation
coefficient > 0.65) was kept in the selection.
Furthermore, only indicators that were significant
(p ≤ 0.05) in univariate regressions (with dY and dA)
were selected for further analysis. For the
governance indicators, a significance level of p ≤ 
0.1 was used, because we assume that the
explanatory power of governance variables is often
only revealed in combination with other control
indicators, i.e., statistical interaction between
governance and control indicators. The maximal
and marginal explanatory power of the governance
indicators were identified. The maximal explanatory
power was obtained by using only the governance
indicators. The marginal explanatory power was
obtained by comparing the model containing all
governance and control indicators to a model
containing only the control indicators. Furthermore,
the signs of the relationships between quality of
governance and area and yield change were
determined. This was done by examining whether
area or yield change decreased or increased when
all governance indicators increased by a value of 1,
i.e., those that were significant.
RESULTS
Between groups analysis
All 173 countries were classified based on changes
in yield dY and cultivated area dA as shown in Figure
1. For any country in the diagram, the position
relative to the origin reflects a change in production
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Fig. 1. Log of relative change in yield (dY) and log of relative change in cultivated area (dA) on the y
and x axis, respectively, both at national level, for 173 countries (dP ≈ dY + dA). Q1 holds “growth”
countries, Q2 “intensifying” countries, Q3 “decline” countries, and Q4 “expansion” countries (see
Methods: Between groups analysis).
during 1975-2007, because dP is approximated by
the sum of dY and dA. Production decreased in all
countries below the diagonal with negative slope,
whereas production increased in countries above it
. On the diagonal, changes in area and yield offset
one another; dP ≈ 0. On the diagonal with positive
slope, changes in production are not dominantly
attributable to either changes in area or changes in
yield; dA = dY. Below it, dA > dY, and above it, dA 
< dY.
From Figure 1 it becomes clear that countries with
a yield decline are a minority. Figure 2 shows that
total areas of decline and expansion countries are
negligible compared with that of growth and/or
intensifying countries, and that growth and
intensifying countries roughly divide the area in
two. Furthermore, most growth countries are
developing or industrializing countries. Mexico,
most of South America, most of Africa, most of the
Middle East, and South East Asia, but also Canada,
Australia, France, and Norway are in the growth
quadrant. Canada and Australia are developed and
wealthy countries in which land is abundant, and
therefore a cheap resource. France and Norway
negligibly increased their cultivated area and are
bordering between growth and intensifying
behavior. Conversely, the bulk of intensifying
countries is made up by industrializing to developed
countries. Most of Europe, New Zealand, the United
States of America, small parts of South America:
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Chile and Uruguay;
China, Japan, Turkey, some of the wealthier African
countries: Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Botswana, and
South Africa; but also Afghanistan, Yemen, and the
African countries of Senegal, Cameroon, Republic
of the Congo, and Somalia are in the intensifying
quadrant. These last few countries clearly deviate
from the bulk of intensifying countries in terms of
wealth and development.
Table 2 shows means and significant differences in
means of the different indicators between the groups
of countries. For those indicators that were not
significantly different with respect to other
quadrants, only the means are given.
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Fig. 2. Geographical representation of the four groups of countries, depending on the signs of dY (log of
relative change in yield at national level) and dA (log of relative change in cultivated area at national
level).
With respect to governance, Table 2 shows that
differences between growth countries and
intensifying countries are most significant, and also
that numbers of observations for these two groups
are highest. Furthermore, expansion countries differ
strongly from intensifying countries because all but
one governance indicators differ significantly. On
average, high quality of governance is mostly seen
in intensifying countries, far above global average
in general. The average quality of governance is
significantly lower in the other groups. Remarkable
is that decline countries distinguish themselves from
other groups by their relatively high political
stability. Growth and intensifying countries differ
in terms of biophysical control indicators as well.
Growth countries are warmer and have more severe
biophysical constraints than intensifying countries.
The present welfare level in intensifying countries
is at ~ $20,100 per capita per year, compared with
~ $14,050 per capita per year for decline countries.
The present welfare levels in growth and expansion
countries are at ~ $10,700 per capita per year and ~
$2,600 per capita per year, respectively. Contrary
to intensifying and decline countries, agricultural
labor force strongly increased for expansion and
growth countries. Finally, initial population density
was almost twice as large for intensifying countries,
compared with the other groups.
Within groups analysis
The within groups analysis could only be performed
for the total number of countries, and for the growth
and intensifying countries, because there were not
sufficient observations for decline and expansion
countries for reliable regressions; n = 10 and n = 18,
respectively. Table 3 presents how well the variance
of production indicators is explained by the
biophysical, demographic, and economic control
classes, separately and together, and how well it is
explained by governance, maximally and
marginally.
Area increases are strongly controlled by economic
and demographic indicators for growth countries
(Table 3). Yield increase could be less well
described, but also seems to be controlled mostly
by economic indicators. Governance explains
between 3% and 19% of variance of change in
cultivated area and between 2% and 9% of variance
of change in yield. The sign of the relationship
between governance and area change is negative,
meaning that the higher the quality of governance,
the lower the area increase. The relationship
between governance and yield change is positive,
meaning that the higher the quality of governance,
the higher the yield increase. For intensifying
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Table 2. Between groups analysis of means. Mean values of indicators per quadrant, and in parentheses
the other quadrants from which means significantly differ according to T-tests. On the right, total means
of these variables. p ≤ 0.1*, p ≤ 0.05**, p ≤ 0.01*** Statistical software: R for statistical computing version
2.8.0 (2008).
Growth (Q1),
N = 80
Intensifying (Q2),
N = 65
Decline (Q3),
N = 10
Expansion (Q4),
N = 18
All, 
N = 173
Governance indicators
Voice and accountability -0.25 (Q2***) 0.32 (Q1***, Q4*) -0.02 -0.14 (Q2*) -0.01
Government effectiveness -0.25 (Q2***) 0.43 (Q1***, Q4***) -0.22 -0.38 (Q2***) -0.001
Regulatory quality -0.26 (Q2***) 0.41 (Q1***, Q4***) -0.11 -0.45 (Q2***) -0.01
Rule of law -0.23 (Q2***) 0.34 (Q1***, Q4*) -0.26 -0.18 (Q2*) -0.01
Political stability -0.19 (Q2*, Q3**) 0.08 (Q1*) 0.27 (Q1**) 0.00 -0.04
Control of corruption -0.25 (Q2***) 0.4 (Q1***, Q4**) -0.27 -0.18 (Q2**) 0.01
Control indicators
Economic
Change in agricultural export value index 0.53 0.51 0.04 0.07 0.44
Initial agricultural export value index (share
of total export value)
237.46 113.47 (Q4*) 175.50 286.39 (Q2*) 187.89
Change in agricultural import value index 0.77 (Q3*) 0.73 0.61 (Q1*) 0.70 0.74
Initial agricultural import value index (share
of total import value)
44.50 44.08 63.48 51.41 46.38
Change in net trade flow value (export
minus import)
-0.08 (Q4**) -0.14 (Q4*) -0.28 -0.51 (Q1**, Q2*) -0.16
Initial net trade flow value (export minus
import) (share of total value)
182.20 69.39 (Q4*) 112.02 234.97 (Q2*) 137.92
Change in GDP (PPP) 0.57 (Q2***) 0.7 (Q1***) 0.72 0.46 0.62
Initial GDP (PPP) (International $/capita/yr) 2880.80 (Q4***) 4006.30 (Q4***) 2678.10 907 (Q1***, Q2***) 3275.40
Change in economically active agricultural
population
0.11 (Q2***) -0.15 (Q1***, Q4***) -0.10 0.16 (Q2***) 0.01
Initial economically active agricultural
population (share of total)
0.51 (Q2***, Q3**) 0.32 (Q1***, Q4***) 0.36 (Q1**, Q4**) 0.55 (Q2***, Q3**) 0.43
Demographic
Change in total population 0.32 (Q2***) 0.18 (Q1***) 0.17 0.26 0.25
Initial total population density (persons/
Km2)
79 (Q2*) 176 (Q1*, Q3*, Q4*) 80 (Q2*) 82 (Q2*) 116
Change in total economically active
population
0.33 (Q2***) 0.21 (Q1***, Q4*) 0.22 0.28 (Q2*) 0.27
Initial economically active population (share
of total)
0.39 (Q4**) 0.40 (Q4**) 0.38 0.36 (Q1**, Q2**) 0.39
(con'd)
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Change in urban population 0.19 (Q2***, Q3***) 0.11 (Q1***) 0.07 (Q1***, Q4***) 0.23 (Q3***) 0.16
Initial urban population (share of total) 0.39 (Q2***) 0.54 (Q1***, Q4***) 0.47 (Q4*) 0.32 (Q2***, Q3*) 0.44
Change in rural population -0.17 (Q3*) -0.16 -0.10 (Q1*) -0.14 -0.16
Initial rural population (share of total) 0.61 (Q2***) 0.46 (Q1***, Q4***) 0.53 (Q4*) 0.68 (Q2***, Q3*) 0.56
Biophysical
Annual mean temperature (°C) 22.80 (Q2***) 17.60 (Q1***, Q4***) 20.40 24.10 (Q2***) 20.80
Annual precipitation (mm) 1361.60 1140.00 1475.70 1273.50 1274.20
Fraction of area constrained by aluminum
toxicity
22.30 (Q2**) 14.60 (Q1**) 25.50 19.90 19.20
Fraction of area constrained by salinity 4.20 (Q2**) 1.70 (Q1**) 3 1.30 3
Fraction of area constrained by high
phosphorus fixation
6 (Q2***) 2 (Q1***) 9.20 6.40 4.50
countries, economic indicators appear to be
important determinants as well. It is striking that
biophysical constraints do not seem to play a role
for these countries. Governance explains between
0% and 8% of variance of area decrease and between
7% and 22% of variance of yield increase. For yield
increase, the maximal governance class gives a
lower value of explained variance than the marginal
governance class, which points to interactions
between the governance and control indicators. The
sign of the relationship between governance and
area decrease is again negative, indicating that better
governance is associated to stronger area decreases.
The sign of the relationship between governance
and yield increase is again positive. Clearly, the
bandwidth of variance explained by governance is
higher for area increase for growth countries, and
higher for yield increase for intensifying countries,
roughly in opposite magnitudes.
For all groups combined, economic factors explain
a significant part of the global variance in changes
in area and yield. Area changes are also determined
by demographic and biophysical constraints.
Governance explains between 4% and 7% of
variance of change in cultivated area and between
2% and 9% of variance of change in yield, similar
to results found by others (Kok and Veldkamp
2001). The bandwidths of variance explained by
governance are now in the same range of magnitude.
The signs of the relationships are again negative for
area change, and positive for yield change.
DISCUSSION
The results from the two analyses presented here
confirm the hypothesis that in countries with lower
quality of governance, agricultural production
increase is more likely to be achieved by area
expansion than by increase in yield. Although
governance indicators do not explain vast shares of
spatial variability in cultivated area and yield
change within groups, a nonzero marginal
explanatory value considerably increases the
likelihood that governance does matter. In reality,
the strengths of relationships are likely to be
somewhere in between the most strictly (marginal
R²) and loosely held criteria (maximal R²). Overall,
the chosen set of control indicators seems adequate
in explaining spatial variability in production
indicators other than governance indicators,
because of the overall consistency of results.
Evidently, control and governance indicators can
never be entirely separated, and interaction is likely
to be present in the real world, e.g., countries with
poor governance suffering more from a harsh
climate than countries with a similar climate but
good governance. In the case of yield change in
intensifying countries, interaction is even such that
marginal explanatory power exceeds maximal
explanatory power.
From Table 2 we could tell that quality of
governance in growth countries differs most from
that in intensifying countries, and that expansion
countries also differ strongly from intensifying
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Table 3. Variance explained (R2) by classes and combinations of classes, per quadrant and dependent. dY 
is the log of relative change in yield at national level, and dA the log of relative change in cultivated area
at national level. N.S. = Not Significant. Sign of relationship refers to whether dA or dY decreases (negative)
or increases (positive), upon increasing the quality of governance in the maximal governance class
regression equations. Statistical software: R for statistical computing version 2.8.0 (2008).
Growth (Q1), N = 80 Intensifying (Q2), N = 65 All, N = 173
dA dY dA dY dA dY
Control classes
Economic (E) 0.65 0.35 0.39 0.07 0.20 0.25
Demographic (D) 0.56 N.S. 0.20 N.S. 0.34 N.S.
Biophysical (B) 0.33 0.13 N.S. N.S. 0.31 0.04
(E) + (D) + (B) 0.75 0.36 0.56 0.07 0.48 0.27
Governance classes
Maximal governance (G) 0.19 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.09
Marginal governance (E+D+B+
G)-(E+D+B)
0.03 0.02 0.00 0.22 0.04 0.02
Sign of relationship - + - + - +
countries in this respect. Furthermore, quality of
governance is high in intensifying countries and low
in other groups. In between groups, significantly
higher quality of governance does not necessarily
lead to a significantly higher yield increase, as
average yield increases were nearly identical for
growth and intensifying countries, which is not
shown. However, the between groups analysis does
indicate a relationship between lower quality of
governance and stronger area increase, for growth
and intensifying countries. This means that the
lower the quality of governance, the more area
increase will occur. The signs of relationships found
in the within groups analysis confirm this by
suggesting that lower quality of governance is more
associated with area increase than with yield
increase, whereas higher quality of governance is
now also more associated with yield increase than
with area increase (Table 3). We also know that
quality of governance seems more important to the
explanation of spatial variability in area increase in
growth countries, and more important to the
explanation of spatial variability in yield increase
in intensifying countries (Table 3). Therefore, in
general, higher quality of governance seems to lead
to substitution behavior of land for inputs, rather
than increases in yield only. This expands on
previous studies that only showed yields to be
positively related to higher quality of governance
(Fulginiti et al. 2004, Thirtle and Piesse 2007, Lio
and Liu 2008). As for the individual governance
indicators, it could be seen that the scores on
political stability differ from those of the other
governance indicators, i.e., relatively low likelihood
of destabilization in growth countries, when
compared with intensifying countries (Table 2).
This indicator is more independent from the others
anyway: one may have poor governance but without
much violence (Table 2). On the other hand,
political instability is unlikely to occur in
combination with good governance.
These results suggest that countries with lower
quality of governance are more oriented toward
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expansion, and that rising levels of production are
achieved more by area increase than by yield
increase. Moreover, as quality of governance
becomes higher, this orientation of countries toward
production tends to flip from expansion toward
intensification. This indicates that it is not possible
to prevent further expansion in growth countries,
unless quality of governance can be improved. On
the contrary, rising levels of production would likely
be accompanied by approximately the same amount
of expansion as yield growth, in line with other
global studies (OECD/FAO 2008, Bindraban et al.
2009, IAASTD 2009). If quality of governance
could be increased, results suggest that less
cultivated area could be used than at present by
growth countries. Furthermore, in growth countries,
quality of governance could still rise radically,
compared to intensifying countries. Therefore,
growth countries appear to have a large potential for
further substitution of agricultural production. The
intensifying countries, which are generally
wealthier and more developed (Fig 2, Table 2) than
growth countries, seem to have realized this
potential to a large extent already. Moreover, yield
increases could be realized more cost effectively in
growth countries than in intensifying countries
(Marra et al. 2003), as growth countries are
generally less developed than intensifying countries
(Fig 2, Table 2). That economic and governance
indicators appear to interact for yield change in
intensifying countries (Table 3), could reflect that
intensifying countries are generally higher up on
their technological learning curve (Marra et al.
2003). Finally, intensifying countries are less
biophysically constrained, which could also be
related to a higher level of technology, knowledge,
and more effective management.
CONCLUSIONS
It was demonstrated that governance in countries
where the agricultural area expands, differs
significantly from that in countries where the
agricultural area contracts. Governance is more
important to the explanation of spatial variability in
area increase in less well-developed countries, and
more important to the explanation of spatial
variability in yield increase in more highly
developed countries. This indicates that in the first
case governance is more related to expansion, and
in the latter more to intensification. Furthermore,
our analysis suggests that countries with poor
governance are more likely to achieve a production
increase by means of area expansion rather than by
means of yield increase. Moreover, as the quality of
governance increases, this orientation toward
production tends to flip from expansion toward
intensification. Should we assume a causal
relationship, the tendency of expanding cultivated
area in less developed countries can be stopped by
improving the quality of governance.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss2/art8/responses/
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